MLB Playoffs revisited: 3 maddening manger moves
By @RyanGrosman
Laced
November 20, 2019
Every year there are some very curious and questionable decisions made by managers during the MLB postseason.
This year was no different.
I always find it both astonishing and maddening how some managers fail to mange with the appropriate sense of urgency, especially in win or go home games.
A classic example is Buck Showalter’s decision making during the 2016 AL Wild Card Game between his Baltimore Orioles and the Toronto Blue Jays.
One of the most basic rules in baseball, especially with your entire season on the line, is if you’re going to lose, lose with your best — something Showalter failed to grasp.
In an extra inning, do or die game on the road, with the score tied, he chose to go with Ubaldo Jiménez instead of Zack Britton, who, at the time, was the best closer in baseball.
And we all know how that turned out. An Edwin Encarnación bomb. Game over. Season over.
Could the Jays have just as easily scored on Britton? Of course they could have. But that’s not the point.
Even though Britton was 47 for 47 in save opportunities with a microscopic 0.54 ERA during the regular season, nothing is ever guaranteed in baseball, especially in the playoffs and especially in a smallest of small sample sizes Wild Card game.
But if the Jays did beat Britton, as the skipper, you simply just tip your hat and go home knowing you lost with your best guy on the mound.
Instead Showalter saved Britton for some fictional inning that never happened. He placed his team’s entire season in the hands of an inferior pitcher while his all-star closer rotted away in the pen.
Like Showalter, Los Angeles Dodgers manager, Dave Roberts, also failed to grasp this cardinal rule. Roberts chose to stick with Joe Kelly in the 10th inning of the series deciding Game 5 of the NLDS instead of going with his closer, Kenley Jansen.
And like Showalter, to no one’s surprise, this too ended horribly for Roberts and the Dodgers.
Kelly eventually loaded the bases for Washington Nationals infielder Howie Kendrick. And with the score still 3–3, Roberts let him pitch. Kendrick launched Kelly’s offering into the seats for a grand slam. Goodbye playoffs. Goodbye season.
Yes, Jansen wasn’t the same old Jansen this season or in the series, but he was still the best Roberts had. Plus he has tons of playoff experience and has come through in these situations time and time again. That’s what he does. That’s why he’s their closer.
All of this followed Roberts’ misuse of Clayton Kershaw earlier in the game, which has already been covered and litigated to death by others. And rightfully so.
Of course, as outsiders, we never have the same facts, stats and in-depth information available to us as the managers do, including who’s tired, who’s hurt, matchup stats, etc. So all we can do is judge each decision based on logic — both baseball logic and good old regular logic.
And for me, it’s important to criticize moves before the action plays out. Not during. Not after. Anyone idiot can judge after the fact and get up on their Twitter high horse, acting like they knew what would happen all along. As they say, hindsight is 20/20.
I don’t do hindsight. I do logic and draw from my over 30 years of watching major league baseball.
Now let’s take a look at 3 bone headed manager decisions that, for whatever reason, didn’t receive the same amount of attention or scorn as Roberts’ moves. But that were equally devastating to their respective teams.
Go with the vet, every time
Let’s begin with AL Manager of the year, Rocco Baldelli.
A manager’s number one job is to put his players in the best position to succeed. Baldelli failed to do this.
In Game 2 of the ALDS, down 1–0 in the series, in Yankee Stadium, in basically a must-win game, Baldelli chose to start a 24-year-old rookie named Randy Dobnak over the vet, Jake Odorizzi. A decision that reeked of disaster long before the first pitch was ever thrown.
Not only was Dobnak a rookie, but he was a rookie with a total of just 5 starts and 28.1 major league innings under his belt.
He made his first appearance in the bigs on August 9 after working his way all the way up from A-ball. He was then sent down 7 days later and recalled for good on August 27.
Sure, he went 2–1 with a 1.59 ERA in his 9 total appearances to finish out the season. But that’s quite a miniscule sample size and a regular season sample size at that. This is the playoffs. Regular season numbers don’t mean Jack shit.
It was a great story. While toiling deep in the bowels of the Twins’ minor league system, Dobnak drove for Uber and Lyft on the side to make some extra dough.
Now he’s getting dropped into a must-win playoff game in Yankee Stadium against that powerhouse lineup? Are you kidding me? That’s a lot to put on the shoulders of someone who hasn’t even cracked 30 MLB innings.
You can see how this was clearly a recipe for disaster. Like 9.2 Richter scale disaster.
Yes, Baldelli didn’t have a ton of options here due to injuries and the suspension to Michael Pineda. But why not start the vet Odorizzi in Game 2 and save Dobnak for a home start in Game 3? You know, take the pressure off just a little bit with the home crowd.
So why did Baldelli ultimately choose Dobnak over Odorizzi? Ground ball rate, apparently.
In his pre-game presser, Baldelli gave the reasoning that Dobnak had the superior ground ball rate.
This being 2019, when balls are flying out of parks more than ever, keeping the ball on the ground is obviously very important. Especially in a homerun park like Yankee Stadium with a lineup that mashed the second most dingers in MLB history.
But to just toss logic aside for a good ground ball rate? That’s both ignorant and careless.
First of all, I don’t know if the Twins based Dobnak’s ground ball stats on his minor league numbers or MLB numbers or both. But either way, like I said before, it’s a very small sample size. And a regular season (and quite possibly a minor league) sample size to boot.
The postseason is a completely different animal. Regular season numbers do not matter.
Second of all, it’s a must-win playoff game in YANKEE FUCKING STADIUM.
I don’t care if Dobnak’s ground ball rate was 100%. You don’t start a rookie in a pressure-packed game like this. Not in Yankee Stadium. Not with that lineup. Not with those fans.
You go with experience. Every time.
I’m all for using stats and analytics to help make decisions. But not at the expense of simple common sense.
Sometimes you just have to push the numbers aside and take a step back. See the forest from the trees or whatever.
And surprise, surprise. Dobnak didn’t last long. The Bronx Bombers wasted no time, completely demolishing him to the tune of 4 earned runs on 6 hits over 2+ innings.
It was like watching a car smash into a wall at top speed even though the wall was clearly visible from a million miles away.
When Baldelli finally lifted Dobnak in the 3rd, the bases were loaded. Reliever Tyler Duffey then gave up a grand slam and it was, Thank you. Goodbye. See you next game.
This reminded me a lot of the 2017 AL Wild Card game, which coincidently featured the Yankees and Twins in Yankee Stadium. Then Yankees manager, Joe Girardi, chose to start Luis Severino, a rookie at the time, because he was their best regular season pitcher, instead of playoff-tested vets like Masahiro Tanaka and C.C. Sabathia.
This wasn’t a 5 or 7 game series. This was a winner take all, you got one shot at this, do or die Wild Card game. And Girardi put the entire season and championship aspirations on the shoulders of a rookie? C’mon.
I wrote about this prior to that game. Severino ended up getting destroyed, giving up 4 hits, 1 walk and 3 earned runs, recording just 1 out before getting pulled. The Yankees were lucky to still win the game.
By no means am I saying that if Odorizzi started instead of Dobnak that the results would’ve been different or that it would’ve been a guaranteed win. Not at all. Maybe Odorizzi gets crushed even harder than Dobnak. Who knows.
But in these situations, you take your chances with the vet. Every time. When the Yankees saw who was starting that night, you can bet they were licking their chops.
Like I said, it’s about putting your players in the best position to succeed. And Baldelli set Dobnak up for absolute disaster.
It turned out to be a nice story with a painful ending.
Hinch finally cracks
Heading into the 2019 World Series between his Houston Astros and the Washington Nationals, A.J. Hinch was one of the best tacticians in the league. His mistakes, if any, were few and far between.
Which makes how he handled the last 3 innings of the championship deciding Game 7 very very surprising.
First of all, I had zero issue with what Hinch did after taking out Zack Greinke, up 2–1 with 1 out in the 7th and a man on first.
Now, you can argue, should Hinch have taken Greinke out in the first place at just 80 pitches? Entering the 7th, Greinke was rolling, surrendering only 1 hit over 6 innings.
But then with 1 out, he gave up a homer to Anthony Rendon and then walked Juan Soto.
I felt it was the right move. Things can change in a millisecond in the playoffs. And after the walk to Soto, it looked like things were about to turn in the Nats’ favour. So Hinch decided to nip this in the bud by taking out Greinke.
Like I said, Hinch is one of the smartest managers out there. And I’m going to trust that he knows his pitchers better than any of us do. If he felt Greinke was done, he was done.
So he takes Greinke out. Now who do you turn to? The consensus from the fans and media alike seemed to be, Duh, you go with Gerrit Cole.
I 100% disagree. You do not go to Gerrit Cole here.
Yes. As I mentioned earlier, the cardinal rule is you lose with your best. Yes, Cole is your best pitcher. By far.
But he’s not your best pitcher in this situation at this moment in time.
That wasn’t the true Gerrit Cole warming up in the pen. He was coming off just 2 days of rest.
Plus, he’s a starter, not a shut it down reliever. He’s not used to coming in with men on base. He’s never ever had a major league relief appearance in his life. Not once. And you want him to try it for the first time with the World Series on the line?
No way.
Is Hinch going to bet the World Series on something he’s never seen Cole do before? Was he going to trust that, fingers crossed, Cole was actually in fact Madison Bumgarner wearing a Gerrit Cole mask?
This was not a Showalter-Britton situation. Cole was not their lights out closer.
What if Hinch brings in Cole and he blows it? Hinch would no doubt get blasted for this move. Why would you bring in a starter on 2 days rest with runners on base? Are you nuts?
The same people who criticized Hinch for not using Cole would’ve been the same people to criticize him if he did use Cole and it blew up in his face.
Also, if you recall, after Cole’s grueling 110-pitch performance in Game 5, he told the interviewer that he was done. He had nothing left. Not exactly the words a manager wants to hear.
No. If you do want to use Cole, you bring him in to start a clean inning. So he can enter the game pitching out of the windup instead of the stretch. Something that he’s used to. This would be putting him in the best position to succeed.
So Cole either starts the 7th or the following inning. And he wasn’t going to start the 7th because Greinke was throwing a 1-hitter at that point.
Sorry to break the news to you. But not every starter is Madison Bumgarner. His 2014 World Series performance out of the pen was miraculous. Something like that may never happen again.
There have been other successful examples. Randy Johnson for one. Also Kershaw (not this year, of course). But they’re few and far between. But it was way too much of a question mark with Cole.
Deploying Cole in this spot would be a desperation move. But at this time, Hinch wasn’t desperate. He had options. And Will Harris was his best option.
Heading into Game 7, Harris had been the Astros most reliable reliever. He’d only allowed 1 run in 11 postseason appearances. This was his job. This is why he was in the Astros’ bullpen.
I don’t care about the big homer he surrendered the night before. That could’ve easily been the result of standing on the mound while the umps took like 10 minutes to review a non-reviewable interference play.
So Harris didn’t come through again in Game 7. I got news for you. It happens. Relievers aren’t perfect. Not even the great Mariano Rivera was perfect every time. Just ask the 2001 World Series champs, Arizona Diamondbacks.
Kendrick’s homerun was also very fluky. He went oppo on a low and outside 91 mph fastball that barely got out, glancing off the foul pole just 336 feet away.
So my problem wasn’t that Hinch took out Greinke or that he went to Harris instead of Cole.
No. My problem was putting Osuna back in to start the 8th. And then, subsequently, leaving him in way too long, down just 3–2 with the World Series on the line.
This was for all the marbles. The Astros could not afford to give up even 1 more run. Hinch’s job at this point was to do whatever he could to not let one more Nationals’ foot touch home plate.
Osuna did get the Astros out of the 7th. But he looked shaky doing so. It was clear he didn’t have his best stuff. And when Osuna doesn’t have his best stuff, he starts to nibble.
Also, Osuna is a big adrenaline guy. He’s not used to entering the game to face a few batters, cooling off on the bench and then trotting back out to the mound.
I wouldn’t have brought Osuna back out to start the 8th. Hinch could’ve gone with Cole here. But I’d still go with an actual reliever at this point, like Joe Smith.
So Osuna started the 8th. He got Turner out. But again, he clearly didn’t have it. He was all over the place facing Adam Eaton, which ended in a walk.
This was the time to take him out — then and there. Hinch felt otherwise. A Soto hit later, it’s now 4–2.
The Nationals just piled on from there to win the World Series.
Don’t save the best for last
The “always lose with your best” rule very much applied to Atlanta Braves manager Brian Snitker in the win or go home Game 5 of the NLDS vs. the St. Louis Cardinals.
What setup to be a very entertaining game became a laugher pretty early on — after just half an inning, in fact, as the Cardinals racked up 10 runs. But it didn’t have to be this way.
Even more amazing than the 10-run 1st inning was the fact that none of it seemed blow back on Snitker and his piss poor decision making.
The fact of the matter is the save doesn’t always come in the 8th or 9th inning. Sometimes it comes in the 7th. Or the 5th. Or, in a series deciding game, the save could very well come in the 1st.
That’s exactly what happened in Game 5 of the NLDS. The save came in the 1st inning. But Snitker chose to manage like it was game 73 of the regular season. He made a series of mistakes that lead to the early blowout and his team’s early exit.
His first mistake was not having someone ready, just in case Mike Foltynewicz faltered. This is an elimination game after all. And while Foltynewicz finished the season strong and had a great showing in his first outing in the series, he was far from a sure bet.
He’d been shaky enough earlier in the season that the Braves made the surprising move to send him to the minors — a year after being named an all-star.
Okay, so even if you don’t have someone ready for the worst case scenario, which you should, at least have someone warming after the first hit.
Nope. Snitker got caught with his pants down. He proceeded to watch Foltynewicz give up hit after hit and run after run.
All told, it was 4–0 Cardinals, bases loaded, 1 out, with pitcher Jack Flaherty due up, when Snitker finally made the move to the bullpen.
And it was the wrong one.
At this point, it’s not looking good for the Braves. But it’s only the 1st inning. They haven’t even batted yet, so they’re still very much in it. They just have to shut it down and escape the inning with no further damage.
So what does Snitker do? He brings in Max Fried.
First of all, why not just leave Foltynewicz in to pitch to the pitcher? He’s already in the game and is warm. Let him get the pitcher. Then go to a reliever.
Second of all, and more importantly, why in the hell did Snitker go to Max Fried? 25 years old. One full big league season under his belt. Very little playoff experience to speak of. That Max Fried.
That’s some confidence Snitker has in this guy.
To come into a 4–0 game with the bases loaded with the season on the line, where one more run could mean eternal doom for his team. I wonder how many times in his career he’s entered the game under these circumstances. I’m guessing zero.
So Fried comes out of the bullpen and into the fire. And promptly walks Flaherty. Now it’s 5–0. After that, all hell broke loose.
I know what Snitker was trying to do here. Being a starter, Fried was Snitker’s long man in the pen. So he thought, I’ll bring him in to close out the inning. Then he can go another 2–3 innings to bridge to his big boys.
That’s sound thinking. For a meaningless regular season game. But this ain’t that.
So let’s rewind. It’s the 1st inning. Bases are loaded. It’s 4–0 with 1 out in an elimination game. This is the save. Right here. This is the game and the series. It isn’t the time to fuck around.
This is where you bring in your best. It doesn’t matter that it’s the 1st inning. You do whatever you have to do to prevent any further damage.
That means bringing in your closer, Mark Melancon. You worry about who’ll close the game later because, well, there might not even be a game to close. You could also go to your other closer, Shane Greene, if you think he’s the best guy for the job.
What you don’t do is feed a young, inexperienced pitcher like Fried to the wolves. In fact, Snitker could’ve brought Fried in to start a clean 2nd inning if he played his cards better.
But he didn’t. And it was game over, season over after half an inning.
In Game 1 of the World Series, Dave Martinez used his closer Daniel Hudson with 2 on, 1 out in the 7th, up 5–3, facing the Astros’ Yuli Gurriel. Why? Because that’s when the save was.
Hudson got out of the inning without giving up a run. But even if he did surrender a run, it was still the right move.
Now, there’s nothing to say that even if Snitker brought in Melancon or Greene instead of Fried that things would’ve turned out differently. Maybe Melancon walks a few batters. Maybe Greene gives up a grand slam.
But at least then, when you go home and rest your head on your pillow, you can tell yourself you made the right move. The other team just beat you.
Snitker very clearly made the wrong move.
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